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Abstract: This paper proposes the concept of ‘involution’ as a perspective to understand the 
socioeconomic dynamics of the domestic business practices within the Japanese animation (anime) 
sector in relation to its overseas performance. There is a counterintuitive gap between the prevalent 
assumption that anime is globally popular and its weak overseas performance. Leaving the detail of 
anime’s business aspects relatively unexamined, the literature on anime has particularly failed to 
address the ‘inward-looking’ feature of the business of the Japanese anime sector. This paper, based 
on long-term fieldwork of the business players in the Japanese anime sector in Tokyo, suggests 
‘involution’ as a key concept to fill this void. This concept, developed by anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz, refers to the process by which a group develops internally by sticking to existing modes of 
operation rather than by opening up to the outer world. This paper depicts how we might understand 
the socioeconomic dynamics of the Japanese anime sector’s mainstream domestic market centrist 
mode of operation in the context of involution. It also explores how the concept could catalyse us to 
envision the alternative future of anime, other than assuming anime’s global popularity: the involuting 
Japanese anime sector might be allowing Euro-American and Chinese Internet conglomerates to 
intervene and take over, turning the Japanese anime sector into one of their subcontractors from which 
they can exploit the sector’s creativity. 
 
Keywords: animation, anime, involution, creative industry, Internet, Asia, China 
 
 
Introduction 
Over the past two decades, Japanese animation (anime) has become one of the most popular 
discussion topics in and outside Japan. Anime has become one of the most globally prevalent 
elements of Japan, influencing the world’s entertainment, creativity, and youth culture. It is now one 
of the crucial lenses through which people interested in Japan can examine the country’s presence in 
the world. 
Many reports, articles, and books attest to anime’s growing global popularity. The journalist 
Douglas McGray suggested that the growing influence of Japan’s popular culture (including anime) 
on the world was making Japan a global cultural superpower (McGray 2002). Anime has been 
celebrated for its influence on Euro-American creativity (e.g. Sugiyama 2006). The number of 
attendees to anime conventions held outside Japan is reported to be growing (e.g. Sudo 2017, pp. 175-
176). As anime spreads world-wide, it has everywhere changed its audiences’ lives and lifestyles (e.g. 
Allison 2006). Given such an increasing impact on the world, one might assume that the future of 
anime must be bright. 
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Figure 1: The development of the market size of anime 
 
(Source: the author based on AJA 2016, p. 150; in 100 million yen)1 
 
When we turn our eyes to the business aspect of anime, however, we see the very different picture 
presented by the weakness of anime’s global performance. Figure 1 shows the shift in the market size 
between 2002 and 2015 of the Japanese anime sector as a whole (sales from the end-users regarding 
anime and its related business: AJA 2016, p. 150). The grey bars on the left represent the total revenue 
of the sector, and the black bars on the right show the revenue from overseas markets (included in the 
total). What we can see from these figures is the considerably small share of overseas revenue within 
the sector’s overall revenue, and the highly volatile ups and downs experienced by the overseas 
revenue between 2002 and 2015. Overseas revenues have never reached 40% of the overall business 
of the Japanese anime sector (2005 being the exception). This performance forms a sharp contrast 
with Japan’s game sector, which has been earning about 46-90% of its revenue from overseas markets 
over the same period (METI 2016, p. 7). It also contrasts with the American film sector, dominated 
by ‘Hollywood major’2 (with which the Japanese anime sector and its advocates dream of catching 
up), which has been generally understood as earning more than 50% of its sales from outside North 
America (e.g. Kawashima 2009, pp. 137-138). The amount received by the Japanese anime sector 
from overseas revenue is surprisingly unstable: it first peaked in 2005, experienced ‘recession’ during 
the late 2000s and early 2010s, and then suddenly went up again in 2015 (experiencing about 78% 
growth from the previous year) to exceed the peak it had previously reached in 2005. That record-
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setting overseas revenue in 2015 was, however, still about 32% of the sector’s overall revenue. One 
can strongly infer that the Japanese anime sector continues to rely heavily on the domestic market, 
performing only weakly on the overseas stage. 
 
When observing such realities, one may wonder how it could be possible for the Japanese anime 
sector to be so globally weak at the same time as it is euphorically celebrated as being globally popular. 
What is happening in the business of the Japanese anime sector? What makes its business so domestic, 
and what impedes the sector in cultivating the overseas market? How can we assess the future of 
anime in terms of its business? 
Previous literature on anime has not sufficiently addressed these questions. It has left anime’s 
business aspects relatively unexamined. Since its global rise, anime has been approached from various 
perspectives, including film studies/text analysis (e.g. LaMarre 2009, Napier 2005), media and 
communication studies (e.g. Steinberg 2012), political economy (e.g. Daliot-Bul 2009, Otmazgin 
2013), cultural studies and globalisation (e.g. Iwabuchi 2002), and fandom/consumer studies (e.g. 
Allison 2006, Ito 2012a, 2012b, Leonard 2005). This literature tends to be predominantly interested 
in understanding how anime is created, read, and consumed, while neglecting a detailed examination 
of how anime is managed as a business: it even states that ‘[i]nvestigating anime as a cultural force 
is even more fascinating than inquiring into its commercial aspects’ (Napier 2005, p. 8) and 
emphasises the significance of not following the money when approaching anime (Condry 2013, p. 
2). The limited literature on the business-managerial issues of anime includes the ethnography of 
entry-level production operators at anime production studios in Tokyo (Morisawa 2015) and works 
regarding the role of anime in facilitating Japanese inbound tourism (e.g. Seaton and Yamamura 2015). 
These works nonetheless rarely address the socioeconomic dynamics of the anime business on how 
the players in the Japanese anime sector coordinate their business, and how such behaviours impact 
anime’s overseas performance and future.  
In the practical circle of anime business and policy, the Japanese anime sector’s ‘inward-looking’ 
(uchimuki) attitude (e.g. Sudo 2017, pp. 193) is often pointed out as impeding its members from 
establishing their business channels outside Japan, failing to ‘fully transform’ anime’s ‘attractiveness 
into business’ in the global marketplace (METI 2015, p. 2). It seems that the Japanese anime sector 
has long been (and still is) indifferent to the growing demand for anime beyond the Japanese national 
border. Anime business players are considered as latecomers in the worldwide enthusiasm for anime, 
whose groundworks were laid not so much by the sector’s strategic market cultivation as by the 
overseas anime fan’s altruistic but unauthorised distribution of anime works through their grass-roots 
networks (in the physical form of videotapes in the pre-Internet era, and in the electronic form of 
‘fansubs’3 in the post-Internet era) (Condry 2013, Leonard 2005). The Japanese anime sector’s minor 
and reactive attempts to capitalise on anime’s overseas popularity (e.g. Mihara 2010, Mihara and 
Yamazaki 2010) have mostly borne little or no fruit (as statistically shown in Figure 1). The sector is 
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also mostly indifferent (or even hostile) towards the public support for developing its business 
overseas, including the Japanese government’s, especially METI’s (the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry), ‘Cool Japan’ policy (an export promotion policy targeting creative industries). 
Although the policy has been trying to provide financial and other support to help the Japanese anime 
sector establish anime’s global distribution infrastructure (Mihara 2014), hoping anime’s global 
popularity will reboot Japan’s currently stagnating economic growth, the Japanese anime sector’s 
sentiment towards such initiatives seems to be that the government should leave the sector alone as 
their intervention will damage anime’s creativity (see Daliot-Bul 2009, Ōtsuka and Ōsawa 2005). In 
what terms their business is ‘inward-looking’, especially at the level of daily business practices, and 
how such attitudes impact on the performance of their overseas business, is nonetheless rarely 
examined in detail. 
This paper proposes a perspective through which we might understand the socioeconomic 
dynamics of the Japanese anime sector’s domestic business practices in relation to its overseas 
performance: the concept of ‘involution’. This concept was developed by the anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz (1963), and refers ‘to a changing process in which an organism facing external impingement 
for change turns inward and increasingly elaborates existing modes of operation and internal 
relationships rather than turning outward and adopting new modes’ (Lü 2000, p. 263). This paper 
depicts how the Japanese anime sector’s mainstream domestic market centrist mode of operation is 
becoming more and more intense in the midst of growing external and peer pressure to globalise. It 
also shows how we could understand such socioeconomic dynamics in terms of the concept of 
involution, and explores how such concept could catalyse us to envision the alternative future of 
anime (other than euphorically assuming its future to be bright). 
The above perspective has been generated as a result of the fieldwork I conducted for 12 months 
over 2014-2015 in Tokyo, Japan (and subsequent follow-up research).4 As is shown below, Tokyo is 
virtually the only city where the Japanese anime industry has accumulated, and is the very source of 
anime’s global flow. The fieldwork includes the participant observation of a start-up venture (referred 
to by the pseudonym ‘DTA’ in this paper) that tries to expand anime business into the Asian emerging 
markets. It also includes the interviews to the sector’s more than 30 business players to whom I asked 
their visions, stances, and practices in anime’s overseas business. The range of my fieldwork 
interlocutors was designed to be diverse: they include executives of big and small anime companies, 
a middle-manager of a middle-size anime company, independent and organisation-affiliated 
producers, experts on anime business, and an entrepreneur who had recently joined anime from 
outside the Japanese anime sector. The list of the key fieldwork interlocutors is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: List of key fieldwork interlocutors 
Interlocutor 
number 
Background Date of observation/interview 
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1 Entrepreneur who started DTA Throughout the fieldwork term 
2 
Producer of an anime production studio 
(informally collaborating with DTA) 
Throughout the fieldwork term 
3 
Person in charge of the legal affairs of anime 
companies and anime production committees 
July 2014 and April 2015 
4 CEO of a small-size anime producing company July 2014 
5 Executive of a big anime company February 2015 
6 
Producer of a TV station in charge of its anime 
channel 
February 2015 
7 
Middle manager of an anime merchandising 
company 
February 2015 
8 Independent anime producer February 2015 
9 Film producer March 2015 
10 
Representative of a governmental agency in 
charge of the Cool Japan policy 
March 2015 
 
The fieldwork was an exploratory attempt to find the preliminary analytical clues through which 
we could develop our understanding of the anime business’s socioeconomic dynamics. I do not claim 
that this paper comprehensively explains the business of anime, especially its involutionary dynamics, 
in a perfectly positivist manner. Japanese anime is a highly complex, decentralised, multifaceted 
sector that refuses any kind of analytical simplification. However, I do intend to argue that this paper 
at least depicts certain ‘partial truths’ (Clifford and Marcus eds. 1986) regarding the Japanese anime 
sector. This research, including my fieldwork, provides the perspective for interpreting the business 
of the Japanese anime sector in a way that allows us to think differently about it. 
 
The Japanese anime sector in Tokyo 
The players in the Japanese anime sector develop anime business projects on the basis of their spatial 
cohesion in Tokyo (cf. Hanzawa 2001, Wakabayashi et al. 2009). The sector generally seems to share 
the spatial characteristic of creative industries accumulating in large city areas: since creative business 
projects are in many cases coordinated on a project basis (project members will disperse after a project 
finishes and go on to become members of different projects), relevant players are incentivised to 
reside closely to each other in order to carry out their businesses smoothly (cf. Goto 2013). The anime 
business is a multi-party project involving not only anime production studios but also manga 
publishers (which provide the original work for anime), TV stations (which air anime episodes), 
music companies (which provide anime’s background music and theme songs), advertising agencies 
(which promote anime), and so on. All such relevant players are in close proximity in central Tokyo 
(i.e. in the 23 Wards of Tokyo: see, for example, Tokyo Metropolitan Government 2010, p. 6, AJA 
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2016, p. 71). 
The current business mode of developing anime projects is the production committee model, in 
which multiple relevant players enter into a partnership agreement to create and develop anime 
projects as a business (cf. Taniguchi and Asou 2010, p. 98). This coordination is necessary for project 
participants to cope with the risk and opportunities involved in the business of anime. As with other 
creative industry sectors (cf. Caves 2000), the level of risk in the anime business is high. It is 
extremely difficult to predict what kind of anime will succeed, and the cost of producing anime is 
driven up mainly due to the labour-intensive nature of the shows. Many players are SME-sized (or at 
least much smaller than the Japanese big national brands), and each player is unable to incur the 
whole cost of the project by themselves. On the other hand, there are many possible secondary uses 
of anime (such as using its characters on products), and such opportunities are attractive for many 
players. They thus join together in the form of a production committee, sharing costs while aiming to 
maximise its benefits from the anime project (cf. Joo et al. 2013, p. 15, Taniguchi and Asou 2010, pp. 
98-99). Each player invests in the committee and incurs a part of the project’s cost. They share the 
rights generated from the project, and each player exercises a certain right related to anime as a 
business. For example, when a video maker invests in an anime project, they get the right to make 
videograms of the anime episodes. In the same manner, a toy maker will make toys, a game maker 
will make games, and so on, using elements of the anime project in which they have invested (cf. 
Taniguchi and Asou 2010, pp. 75-76, 80-85). 
The general picture of the flow of an anime business project under the production committee model 
is as follows. The financial resources are aggregated in a production committee. Using this budget, 
the production committee outsources the creation work to the animation studio, which hires or 
outsources the creative human resources (such as directors, playwrights, sound directors, animators, 
and voice actors/actresses) to make the anime shows. When they finish making anime episodes, they 
deliver them to the TV station to be aired. After airing the anime, which makes the anime and its 
characters widely known to the public (the fans), the anime business players start to make and 
distribute relevant goods to monetise on that popularity and recoup the costs of creating the work. 
Committee meetings are held on a regular basis, normally in a conference room provided by one of 
the members. All the representatives from the production committee member companies attend the 
meeting, and they collectively discuss various managerial issues involved in their anime project, 
including reporting on the sales of relevant goods, checking the quality of the merchandising, and 
considering new business directions. The committee will disperse, or simply become inactive, after 
the dust of the anime project settles, and each member will move on to another anime project in 
alliance with different partners (Interlocutor 2). 
 
The ‘enigma’ of domestic market centrism 
The fieldwork in the Japanese anime sector detected what I refer to here as its ‘domestic market 
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centrism’: the sector’s tendency to prioritise the Japanese domestic market and treat overseas ones as 
peripheral. Its dynamics could be characterised as what sociologist Howard Becker (1982) calls a 
‘mixed blessing’ (p. 6) in optimising and conventionalising its mode of operation to the Japanese 
domestic market.       
 
[…] by using other than the conventional means of distribution or no channel of distribution at all, artists 
suffer some disadvantages, and their work takes a different form than it might have if regular distribution 
had been available. They usually see this situation as an unmixed curse, and hope to gain access to regular 
channels of distribution, or whatever other conventional facilities they find unavailable. But since […] the 
regular means of carrying on support activities substantially constrain what can be done, not to have them 
available, inconvenient or worse as that may be, also opens up otherwise unavailable possibilities. Access 
to all the regular means of doing things is a mixed blessing.  
(Ibid.) 
 
What I observed in the fieldwork is that the Japanese anime sector’s domestic market centrism is 
making overseas business an ‘unconventional’ practice, which requires players suffer considerable 
‘disadvantages’ in doing it, although cultivating overseas markets may open up ‘otherwise 
unavailable possibilities’ for the Japanese anime sector. 
During my fieldwork, many anime businesspeople pointed out that overseas business is marginal 
to their business project agenda, and admitted that their main focus is on competing with their rivals 
in the Japanese domestic market. The dominant understanding of the players in the Japanese anime 
sector was that the Japanese domestic anime market is (still) big enough to support the sector as a 
whole. It is not even ‘economically rational’ for the Japanese anime sector to try and reach out to 
prospective consumers overseas because Japan is the world’s third biggest economy (Interlocutor 9). 
According to some players, the fact that anime business generally still relies heavily on domestic TV 
stations is relevant to this priority. Domestic TV is anime’s first ‘window’ for being aired; their primal 
interest is in winning the ratings race against other rival stations in Japan (Interlocutor 8). Since their 
programmes (including anime shows) are only aired within Japan, anime’s committee business is 
hugely gravitated and optimised towards the Japanese domestic market (cf. Mihara 2010). This bias 
of the Japanese anime sector’s business towards the domestic market was in fact the very reason for 
DTA to start its venture business: it tried to ‘innovate’ the sector by changing its business flow from 
domestic market centrist to overseas market oriented (Interlocutor 1 and 2).5 
In the everyday work of anime production committees, overseas businesses often seem to be 
outsourced to overseas external agents and relegated outside their main scope. The relationship 
between anime production committees and overseas agents that I detected during my fieldwork could 
be summarised as follows. Anime production committees routinely license out ‘overseas business 
rights’ (the right to make anime’s videograms, to stream the anime, to produce the anime’s 
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merchandise, and so on) generated by their anime projects to overseas agents (in the United States 
and Hong Kong, for example) and let these agents develop the rights for them (for example by selling 
the rights to overseas TV stations and merchandisers). Once they are licensed out to the agents, and 
once they get minimum guarantees of those rights from the agents, the production committees lose 
interest in the agents’ performance and in further developing those rights in foreign markets. The 
anime production committees rarely attempt to sell their overseas business rights to overseas markets 
themselves. One interlocutor stated, typically: 
 
The anime shows aired on the channel during my term were mainly targeted at Japanese domestic anime 
audiences. […] They had a low affinity for overseas markets. The basic way for the production committee 
of each anime show to expand their businesses overseas was to license out the rights to the overseas 
distributors and leave the overseas business to them (omakase). The committees didn’t peddle their anime 
overseas by themselves. We first got MG (minimum guarantee) from the distributors at the time we licensed 
out the rights to them, and the contracts said that the committees could get a certain percentage of the 
revenues that the distributors generated in the overseas markets after they recouped the costs of developing 
the overseas business rights. However, we never received such additional revenues from them. The 
committees were not even informed by the distributors how much they produced in sales in which countries, 
or in which countries their anime shows were aired. Moreover, the committees could not spend any money 
to visit the distributors’ office to acquire such information.  
(Interlocutor 6) 
 
It seems that to outsource the cultivation of the overseas market to overseas agents – rather than 
doing it themselves – is the Japanese anime sector’s ‘routine’ in carrying out its anime business 
(Interlocutor 5). This practice seems to be so conventional that the Japanese anime sector seems not 
to take research on overseas anime business seriously if it does not ask any questions about overseas 
agents. 
  This convention also seems to have resulted in an oligopoly over the overseas business rights of 
Japanese anime controlled by a limited number of overseas agents, which prevents such rights from 
being traded openly in the global marketplace (such as international trade shows) (Interlocutor 3). I 
also found during my fieldwork that the value of the overseas business rights of anime projects is 
considered to be extremely low by the anime production committees, and that these are sold at low 
prices to overseas agents (although the actual prices were not disclosed) (Interlocutor 3). This seems 
to be due to the anime production committees’ indifference and inability to maximise their value and 
price, and the fact that the committees are uninterested and unable to check the agents’ performances, 
enabling existing overseas agents to hold down the price of the overseas business rights. 
Management scholar Hugh Whittaker (1997) uses the term ‘friendly rivalry’ (p. 14) to describe the 
socioeconomic relationship between the manufacturing SMEs accumulating in southern Tokyo, and 
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this phenomenon was also observed in the business coordination of anime production committees, 
preventing committee members from trying to raise the value of their overseas business rights 
together. Many players in the Japanese anime sector suggested to me during my fieldwork that an 
anime production committee is not monolithic in carrying out its anime business. Rather, the members 
of the same anime production committee are ‘friends but rivals’ (nakama dakedo raibaru): although 
they carry out the same anime project together, they know that each member is likely to ‘steal a march’ 
(nukegake) on the others at any time and pursue or secure their self-interest at the expense of other 
committee members. This is why they frequently hold nomikai (drinking sessions): they ostensibly 
hobnob together in a friendly manner but probe under the surface for the true intentions of their fellow 
committee members (Interlocutor 7). I have already mentioned that under the production committee 
system each member exercises a certain right related to anime in their businesses. This ultimately 
means that a video maker cares only about making videograms, a toy maker cares only about making 
toys, a game maker cares only about making games, and nobody cares about doing business overseas. 
Representatives of each member company are employees sent to participate in the anime production 
committee (and attend committee meetings). The top priority of such a representative is not so much 
to maximise the profit of the committee as a whole, but to maximise the profit of the company he/she 
belongs to (Interlocutor 8). 
The marginality of overseas issues in the works of anime production committees is often attributed 
to the lack of established distribution platforms for their business in the overseas markets (Interlocutor 
4: see also Mihara 2010), and the over-competition in the Japanese domestic anime market that 
deprives the committee members of the time to contemplate overseas business. 
 
Why are Japanese anime industries reluctant to cultivate overseas markets? There are several reasons. One 
reason is that they are too busy handling their domestic anime works at this precise moment to think about 
the overseas market. From my own experience in anime-related works, it is true that it is absolutely 
impossible to have time for overseas issues. 
 
The other reason is because there are no established distribution channels for the overseas market. For the 
domestic anime market, the system for distributing and using their anime work commercially is established. 
If you toss your anime works into such a system, they will almost automatically spread nation-wide. Such a 
system is not established in the overseas market. […] The Japanese anime industry does not have the system 
into which they could throw their anime works and spread them world-wide.  
(Interlocutor 3) 
 
Under such conditions, proposals to develop overseas businesses other than by outsourcing them to 
overseas agents seem strongly discouraged in the everyday work of anime production committees. 
One anime producer told me that anime committees often allow themselves to consider developing 
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their business overseas only after they have succeeded in the domestic Japanese market. He lamented 
that ‘the level of accountability’ in the overseas anime business was extremely high compared with 
that in the domestic anime business: although the anime sector is generally tolerant of failures in the 
domestic market, the sector does not allow for anime projects to fail overseas (Interlocutor 8). Many 
players told me that the revenues from overseas markets are considered no more than a ‘bonus’ in 
their anime projects (cf. Sudo 2017, p. 193). 
One of the prominent characteristics that could be highlighted in the above ‘conventional’ mode of 
operation in the Japanese anime sector is its highly paradoxical insistence on remaining in its domestic 
market. It is paradoxical because, throughout my fieldwork, nobody in the sector denied that the 
Japanese domestic anime market will shrink in the mid- to long-term (e.g. Interlocutor 3) due to the 
low birth rate and rising longevity, which means that the numbers of Japanese youth (the sector’s 
central customers) are decreasing (Interlocutor 7). Nor did anyone deny that overseas markets are 
becoming an important alternative source of income for the sector (Interlocutor 3 and 5). It is also 
evident to virtually everybody in the Japanese anime sector that some anime business projects have 
succeeded in cultivating the overseas market and establishing their own distribution channels. The 
most famous case is Pokémon, which earned roughly the same amount of money from the US, Europe 
and Asia, including Japan (about ¥1 trillion each: see, for example, Humanmedia 2013, p. 30). If that 
is the case, how can players justify the Japanese anime sector’s domestic market centrism? Is it really 
‘economically rational’ for the anime sector to stick to a shrinking market and ignore the growing 
ones? How can one conclude that anime’s overseas business rights have low value, without even 
trying to maximise their prices by themselves, particularly when some of their peers have succeeded 
in this? 
One anime producer described this paradox as the Japanese anime sector’s ‘enigma’ (nazo). He 
wondered what made the Japanese anime sector concentrate on a domestic market its members 
themselves well know (at least theoretically) to be futureless, and what prevented the sector from 
changing its current way of doing business to optimise its business model to an overseas market in 
which its members know their future lies (again, at least theoretically: Interlocutor 8). The players in 
the Japanese anime sector know what they should do, but they can’t, or don’t want to, take action.  
This situation appears unsatisfactory for those who see uncultivated potential in the overseas 
market, in other words those who aspire to open up anime’s ‘otherwise unavailable possibilities’. 
During my fieldwork, some players in the Japanese anime sector showed grave concerns over the 
sector’s conservative attitudes of rejecting change. This attitude was one of the biggest barriers 
hindering DTA in its attempts to involve the players in the sector in their business: the more dominant 
and mainstream the players in the Japanese anime sector become, the less they are incentivised to 
embark on ‘risky’ business in growing Asian countries (Interlocutor 1). According to one anime 
producer, the reason for this is simply that it is safe to stick to the current business model, which 
minimises the players’ risk of being responsible for breaking convention in coordinating their anime 
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business. ‘But if you keep on avoiding that kind of risk,’ the producer says, ‘you will accumulate 
more fatal risk in the long run – the risk of losing your income resource as a whole’ (Interlocutor 2). 
This enigmatic domestic market centrism is indeed a ‘mixed blessing’. Although everybody in the 
sector knows that the current situation is killing them slowly, and although they know that there are 
ways to escape it which lead them to the growing opportunities, they stay in the current structure, 
willingly or unwillingly, because it keeps them safe and alive – at least for now. 
 
The Japanese anime sector involuting 
Here we observe the tautological ‘circular flow’ (Schumpeter 1934, p.71) of the logic and practice of 
domestic market centrism. Does the existence of the established system make the sector busier and 
busier in its domestic anime business, or has the sector only become optimised to the Japanese 
domestic market because that is the only market in which the sector is interested? Does the lack of an 
established system to develop overseas anime business make the sector indifferent to such business, 
or is it because the sector is indifferent to overseas business that a system for it has never been 
established? This chicken-or-egg controversy overlaps with what anthropologist Fredrik Barth (1966) 
called the ‘skipper’s dilemma’ (p. 10). Barth ethnographically depicted the strong tendency of the 
herring-catching vessels off the coast of Norway to follow other vessels rather than the herring itself 
in deciding where to fish: 
 
 
The pattern of movement of vessels on the fishing banks is so extreme that it cannot fail to strike an observer 
immediately: the several hundred vessels of the fleet constantly tend to congregate in small areas of the 
immense, and potentially bountiful, expanse of sea; most attention is concentrated on discovering the 
movements of other vessels, and most time is spent chasing other vessels to such unplanned and fruitless 
rendezvous. 
 
It is for the skipper to take the decision of choosing the vessel’s course […]. There can be no doubt that a 
vessel’s chance of finding herring is greater if it strikes out on its own than if it follows other vessels. […] 
But if a skipper, without special information to justify the move, decides to go elsewhere than where other 
vessels go, he demands more trust in his transaction with the crew. […] The skipper also risks more by not 
joining the cluster: if a few vessels among many make a catch, the crew and the netboss can claim that it 
might have been them, had the skipper only given them the chance. If the vessel on the other hand follows 
the rest, they are no worse off than most, and the onus of failure does not fall on the skipper.  
(Ibid., emphasis in the original) 
 
The way a vessel chronically loses the chance to strike out ‘on its own’ to profit from the ‘immense, 
and potentially bountiful, expanse of sea’ by focusing too much on competing with rival vessels, thus 
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leading to all the vessels congregating ‘in small areas’ of the ocean, forms a striking parallel with the 
way the Japanese anime sector is prevented (or prevents itself) from cultivating the overseas market. 
The Japanese anime sector accumulating in Tokyo similarly seems so concentrated on its domestic 
‘friendly rivalry’ that it is failing to head itself off its circular flow of domestic market centrism. 
I would argue that this spiral of domestic market centrism in the Japanese anime sector is 
‘involuting’. In other words, the Japanese anime sector is sticking more than ever to its way of 
carrying out the anime business by concentrating on the Japanese domestic market: this is leading the 
sector to a position that allows global distributors to take over, and not to the position that enables it 
to proactively distribute its works and products globally. The Japanese anime sector as a whole seems 
to be becoming subordinate to globalisation: it is becoming little more than one of the many 
subcontractors of the global entertainment conglomerates rising in Euro-American and Asian 
countries. 
The term ‘involution’ seems to have become a common term in social science to ‘refer to a 
changing process in which an organism facing external impingement for change turns inward and 
increasingly elaborates existing modes of operation and internal relationships rather than turning 
outward and adopting new modes’ (Lü 2000, p. 263). The concept was famously developed by the 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1963) to explain the development or survival pattern observed in the 
Javanese farming villages in colonial and post-colonial Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s. Borrowing 
the concept from anthropologist Alexander Goldenweiser (1936), Geertz defined involution as ‘the 
overdriving of an established form in such a way that it becomes rigid through an inward 
overelaboration of detail’ (Geertz 1963, p. 82). He depicted how the Javanese agricultural system had 
failed ‘either to stabilize or transform themselves into a new pattern but rather’ continued ‘to develop 
by becoming internally more complicated’ (p. 81) to absorb the growing surplus labour that could not 
be absorbed by the country’s tiny industrial sector, and to cope with the pressure of globalisation led 
by Dutch colonial corporation. 
The concept of involution has been employed by a number of social scientists interested in 
organisational or social change, and applied (partially or wholly, and with or without explicitly 
referring to Geertz) to a number of sectors, clusters and organisations. They include the post-Soviet 
Russian economy (Burawoy et al. 2000), the Chinese Communist Party (Lü 2000), SME 
manufacturing clusters in Nigeria (Meagher 2007), and urban slums (Davis 2004). Sociologist John 
Lie (2014) once briefly argued that the ‘involuted’ nature of Japanese popular music market impeded 
the entry of the Korean popular music business. Such mechanics, according to him, included highly 
established domestic business conventions supported by tightly interconnected network of major 
domestic players, and the fierce competition within that closed system (pp. 12-14). Although these 
features generally seem to be in parallel with those of the Japanese anime sector, Liu nonetheless used 
the concept to contextualise the market’s protectionist mechanics vis-à-vis Korean music business, 
and did not apply it to examine the globalising of Japanese popular music business itself (which is 
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the main perspective adopted by this paper in terms of anime).6 
Sociologist Kate Meagher’s work (2007) regarding the chronological impact of involution on the 
Nigerian SME manufacturing clusters vis-à-vis their global socioeconomic environment is worth 
referring to for the purpose of this paper. Focusing on three manufacturing clusters (weaving, shoe 
and garment clusters) in two different regions of Nigeria, she depicts how ‘the challenges of 
liberalization and globalization,’ with the ‘state neglect’ to mitigate them, ‘have triggered the process 
of involution’ in the clusters. The features of their involution include ‘an intensification of low-road 
strategy of copying, undercutting, sweated labour and declining quality,’ ‘a dynamic of under-training, 
high labour turnover and extreme competition,’ and ‘(t)echnical regression […] owing to poor 
facilities and a downward spiral of low prices and low incomes’ (p. 496). She also depicts how such 
‘involutionary dynamics’ within the Nigerian manufacturing clusters ‘have been accompanied by’ a 
process driving them to become ‘nodes’ of a more informal and exploitative side of the global 
commodity chain (such as ‘smuggling networks’) that operate ‘under the radar of the global trading 
system’ (p. 497). This has further allowed the transnational and global religious organisations (such 
as Pentecostal Christianity) to intervene in the clusters for such organisations to ‘provide alternative 
support linkages’: the clusters’ approach towards such global organisations has ‘emerged as a means 
of securing channels of access to resources in the face of collapsing markets’ (p. 498). 
There is a striking parallel (and overlap) between the Japanese anime sector’s dynamics in the 
circular flow of domestic market centrism and the features of ‘involution’ depicted above: the sector’s 
domestic market centrist mode of operation is becoming more and more involutionarily intense. As 
one interlocutor straightforwardly depicts: 
 
 
 
As for overseas market cultivation, we just can’t do anything because the more we try to do something, the 
more we lose our money in the current situation. We know that we will not be able to stand in the mid- and 
long-term if this goes on, but we cannot take any specific actions right now.  
(Interlocutor 3) 
 
This vividly suggests that the Japanese anime sector is currently caught up in the ‘incoming 
involutionary tide’ (Burawoy et al. 2000, p. 47) of domestic market centrism, with its irresistible 
institutional inertia imposed on everyday anime business practices. Similarly, in his book on current 
anime business trend in Japan, journalist Tadashi Sudo (2017) introduces a metaphor for the Japanese 
anime sector’s persistence in adhering to its shrinking Japanese domestic market: the sector is 
‘playing musical chairs while the number of chairs are decreasing’ (p. 193). The point here seems not 
only that the number of chairs are decreasing, but also that the sector is still following the same rules 
within the game of musical chairs. 
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Chronologically speaking, some minor attempts have been made by the Japanese anime sector to 
cultivate overseas market in 2002-2006 (as shown in Figure 1 in the growth of overseas revenue). 
Some players who saw their business’ ‘otherwise unavailable possibilities’ in the rising popularity of 
anime overseas (and in Pokémon’s global hit that started to take place from the early 2000s) tried to 
establish their business infrastructure in the overseas markets, especially in the US market: this 
included establishing US branches and contracting with localisers and distributors there (such as DVD 
mass retailers) to sell their works on the US market. These attempts nonetheless virtually ended in 
failure, not only because of the sector’s domestic market centrism, but also because of the rise of the 
Internet (this made DVDs – which the sector mostly relied on in its business plan for US sales – an 
outdated media for watching anime) and of the global economic downturn in 2008 (which destroyed 
many of their local US business partners). As a result, the amount and the percentage of revenue from 
the overseas market started to go down from 2006. This is referred to among players in the anime 
sector as the ‘bubble burst’ of anime’s overseas market (for an overview of the history of the anime 
business in North America, see Daliot-Bul 2014, Mihara and Yamazaki 2010, Otmazgin 2014). 
This ‘bubble burst’ seems to have made the Japanese anime sector more unwilling than ever to do 
overseas business. Although Figure 1 shows that the market size of anime as a whole revived after 
2009, the nature of this growth seems to be domestic-market-driven rather than overseas-market-
driven. For example, although anime’s market size in 2013 surpassed that of 2008 (the year in which 
the anime market was at its biggest prior to 2012), the amount and percentage of the revenue from 
the overseas market in 2013 were considerably lower than in 2008 (in 2013 the amount and percentage 
of the revenue from the overseas market were ¥2,823 hundred million and about 19% respectively, in 
contrast with ¥4,137 hundred million and about 30% in 2008).  
As mentioned above, it is highly unlikely that the growth of anime’s market size will last in the 
mid- and long-term, at least insofar as it relies on the Japanese domestic market. The revival of the 
anime market after 2009 seems to have been driven by ‘an intensification of low-road strategy’ to 
stick to the ‘existing modes of operation and internal relationships’, including the ‘extreme 
competition’ in the domestic market and increasing ‘sweated labour’ under the ‘overelaboration’ of 
the current anime production committee model. 
Many people in the Japanese anime sector told me during my fieldwork that the member companies 
of most anime production committees were just repeatedly constituted (i.e. overelaborated) from the 
established pool of the limited number of players in the sector, forming a small-town community 
(mura shakai) with cohesively interconnected members who show implicit (sometimes explicit) 
hostility towards outsiders (e.g. Interlocutors 4, 7). As briefly mentioned above, players in the 
Japanese anime sector are already too busy competing with each other domestically (‘friendly 
rivalry’) to think about overseas markets. This trend seems to be becoming worse. For example, the 
number of anime titles created for airing on domestic TV seemed to resume its growth from 2010 and 
has been constantly growing ever since, showing about 60% growth from 200 titles in 2010 to 322 
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titles in 2014 (and 341 titles in 2015: see AJA 2016, p. 26). According to Figure 1, however, anime’s 
domestic market size (revenues excluding overseas ones) during the same term 2010-2014 only 
showed about 27% growth (from about ¥1.02 trillion in 2010 to about ¥1.3 trillion in 2014), and even 
shrank from 2014 to 2015. These statistics suggest that the domestic anime market has been 
overelaborated: in other words, the share of the pie of the domestic anime market per anime title is 
becoming smaller and smaller. One interlocutor told me during my fieldwork that the domestic anime 
market is currently undergoing ‘excessive competition’ (Interlocutor 3).  
The work of creating anime shows also seems overdriven. Anime creators’ difficult working 
conditions makes them increasingly poor as well as increasingly busy, and this is currently one of the 
most hotly debated topics in the Japanese anime sector. For example, the association for anime 
creators, JAniCA (the Japan Animation Creators Association), in its annual report on the working 
environment of anime creators (JAniCA 2015), reported that creators were complaining that the 
payments they received for their work were declining, while the deadlines were becoming shorter and 
shorter and the quality required becoming higher and higher (e.g. pp. 54-55, 82). 
It is worth noting, in terms of Meagher’s aforementioned insights (2007), that such an involution 
of the Japanese anime sector seems to have developed in parallel with its ‘neglect’ of the growing 
opportunities (and recommendations) of globalisation, provided not only by the increasing demand 
of overseas fans but also by the state with its attempt to promote the exportation of anime. The Cool 
Japan policy, especially in terms of facilitating anime’s overseas business, is widely recognised as 
unsuccessful, due not only to the government’s struggle to communicate effectively with the sector 
(cf. Interlocutors 5 and 10: see also Mihara 2014) but also to the sector’s strong sentiment that the 
government should leave the sector alone (cf. Ōtsuka and Ōsawa 2005, p.190): there is an assumption 
that governmental intervention might mould anime’s potential to make it serve the national interest 
(cf. Daliot-Bul 2009). It is also worth noting that the sector’s involution seems to have been 
‘accompanied’ almost constantly by the ‘informal’ globalisation of anime through the grass-roots 
distribution channels of overseas fan communities (a copyright grey zone) which operate ‘under the 
radar of’ official anime distribution tracks (e.g. fansub distribution). This has long been justified by 
the overseas fans themselves as activities that have made anime globally popular on behalf of the 
Japanese anime sector (see Leonard 2005), and has been sympathetically referred to by some scholars 
as one of the most important features of transnational fan culture’s rebellion against the power of 
global media conglomerates (in which, I am afraid, most players in the Japanese anime sector does 
not take part) (e.g. Condry 2013, Ito 2012a, 2012b). It has, however, virtually ‘exploited’ the Japanese 
anime sector, returning no direct monetary revenues to its players. 
The sudden sharp jump in the overseas revenue of the Japanese anime sector in 2015 in Figure 1 
(about 78% of growth from the previous year, the biggest since 2002) has been attributed to the entry 
of the overseas Euro-American and Chinese Internet platformers into the sector, performing the big 
purchasing and investment power of anime (AJA 2016, pp. 7-8, 17, 61-70). This seems to show, by 
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referring again to Meagher (2007), that the Japanese anime sector has not so much taken the ‘high-
road strategy’ of proactively ‘striking out’ into the global export market; rather, it suggests that the 
sector’s involution is approaching the stage of allowing the intervention of transnational and global 
media conglomerates that ‘provide alternative support linkages’ to the sector, which might result in 
the exploitation of the Japanese anime sector as a whole by such global conglomerates.  
The Japanese anime sector nonetheless seems to welcome their intervention as its ‘channels of 
access to resources’ to continue and scale up anime business, and as its distribution channels through 
which it can stream its anime works world-wide ‘in the face of’ shrinking Japanese domestic anime 
market. The sector was indeed in a buoyant mood when I was doing my fieldwork, as one of the 
world’s biggest Internet streaming platformers, Netflix, had entered the Japanese market to purchase 
numerous anime works at unbelievably high prices. Many players in the sector told me that Internet 
streaming was now the ‘mainstream’ method for doing overseas business. One interlocutor stated, 
typically: 
 
The ‘overseas fever’ has currently been reignited in the realm of Internet streaming. As for the major cases, 
Netflix is accelerating its activity to purchase Japanese anime. I have the experience of being in charge of 
the deal for Netflix to buy a certain anime work. […] As the case of Netflix shows, it could be said that 
Internet streaming is the current mainstream trend in expanding anime business overseas.  
(Interlocutor 3) 
 
 Within that trend, the presence of Chinese Internet platformers, alongside with the Euro-American 
ones, seemed to become bigger and bigger.  
 
Neighbour countries such as China are rapidly rising in the field of the entertainment business, including 
anime. […] The corporate values of the Chinese Internet streaming companies such as Youku and Tudou 
are growing very big. The companies in the field of social networking service and electronic commerce such 
as Tencent and Alibaba are rising rapidly as well. 
(Interlocutor 5) 
 
 
In fact, many news items (and rumours) suggesting such a rise in the presence of Euro-American 
and Chinese Internet conglomerates in the Japanese anime business scene have started to circulate. 
Sudo (2017) reports how the Chinese media conglomerates (including Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and 
their affiliated companies) have started to play key roles in the anime business scene in Japan. This 
includes not only purchasing Internet streaming rights from existing anime production committees, 
but also investing in (i.e. becoming members of) those committees, forming committees as their 
central members, investing independently in the Japanese anime projects without forming committees, 
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providing original comic works to be animated and aired in Japan, and ‘rescuing’ an anime project 
from being cancelled by injecting funds after the business failure of the Japanese anime production 
studio originally in charge of making that title (pp. 18-28). He also reports how the American ‘big IT 
companies’ such as Netflix and Amazon have started to seek business opportunities in the Japanese 
anime sector. He indicates the high levels of loyalty they offer to the Japanese anime production 
committees for their anime works’ streaming rights, which are even able to cover most of the costs of 
making the whole anime series, and reports how the Japanese anime players have therefore started to 
crowd into such American IT conglomerates (pp. 54-66). 
Ironically, the above approach of big IT conglomerates to the Japanese anime sector seem to be 
perfectly compatible with the sector’s involuting domestic market centrism, i.e. its ‘low-road strategy’ 
of not leaving Japan. The sector still does not need to care about how to distribute their anime 
overseas: now Netflix or Baidu will do it for the sector. In this regard, the above welcoming attitude 
of the Japanese anime sector towards the global and transnational Internet platformers could be 
evaluated as a sign that the sector is still retreating from the overseas market, despite the numerical 
growth in the sector’s overseas revenue. Another irony is that the Japanese government’s struggling 
Cool Japan policy seemed to have aspired to the same approach with the aforementioned big IT 
conglomerates towards the Japanese anime sector in facilitating the globalisation of anime business. 
In 2014, the Cool Japan Fund, a public-private fund established in 2013 at METI’s initiative, invested 
¥1 billion (alongside the investment of multiple Japanese anime-related companies) into a Japanese 
business corporation that operated an overseas anime Internet streaming service, expecting to 
establish the overseas anime distribution infrastructure in an ‘all Japan’ framework.7 However, not 
many players in the Japanese anime sector seemed to be crowded onto this platform: the corporation 
‘exited’ the Cool Japan Fund’s investment in March 2017,8 and eventually closed their overseas 
Internet streaming service in the following October.9 Put bluntly, it seems the Japanese anime sector 
welcomed the Internet platformers run by Euro-American and Chinese capitals, while neglecting the 
Internet platformers run by Japanese capital.10 Although examining this gap is beyond the scope of 
this paper, it is worth investigating further in another setting, especially in terms of the ‘state neglect’ 
(or neglected?) aspects of the involution (Meagher 2007, p. 496). 
It could also be said that my fieldwork has ethnographically witnessed a critical sea change in the 
Japanese anime sector’s overseas business scene, especially in its relationship with overseas players 
(Sudo 2017). It seems that, while the Japanese anime sector is sticking to its domestic market centrism, 
the business coordination in the sector is shifting from the ‘conventional’ method (i.e. anime 
production committees licensing out their overseas business rights to overseas agents) to a new 
method (in which the overseas players make anime – by involving the players in the Japanese anime 
sector – that they think is worth distributing world-wide by themselves). While in the formal mode 
the sector is outsourcing its overseas works to overseas agents, in the latter mode the Japanese anime 
sector as a whole is outsourced to the global and transnational Internet conglomerates, providing them 
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with entertainment content to enhance their global presence. The Japanese anime sector seems to have 
been captured on the ‘radar’ of the global trading system of creative industries, and has been 
subordinated to the state of a passive node, from which the global entertainment conglomerates can 
exploit its creativity. 
During my fieldwork, one interlocutor expressed his concern that the Japanese anime sector might 
be swallowed up by such big IT conglomerates: 
 
I have a sense of trepidation that if we do nothing, China will take over the Japanese market itself. I think 
the Japanese anime industry is in danger of becoming China’s ‘premium subcontractor’ if we sit around and 
do nothing. 
 
The possible scenario of our relationship with China in the near future is that Chinese anime companies will 
place orders for their own anime projects with Japanese anime creators by offering them compensations that 
are higher than those offered by Japanese anime companies. Since Japanese anime creators are generally 
not interested in going overseas, I think most of them would not migrate to China. But if the Japanese anime 
creators are allowed to do work ordered from Chinese anime companies by staying in Japan and following 
the same procedure as they do when working with Japanese anime companies, I think many creators would 
be attracted to the Chinese companies. 
(Interlocutor 5) 
 
The AJA (2016) suggests that the investment from overseas internet streaming companies (including 
Netflix, Amazon, and Chinese Internet companies) is approaching the possibility of exceeding that 
of Japanese ones. They also suggest that the ‘next business model’ of anime may be centred around 
such Internet streaming (p. 45). 
On the one hand, some seem to welcome this entry of the global and transnational Internet 
platforms into the Japanese anime sector as a way of revitalising the anime business (e.g. Sudo 2017). 
On the other, this trend is sometimes seen as a process by which such IT conglomerates might ‘take 
hold of’ Japan’s anime contents (AJA 2016, p. 8) and swallow the Japanese anime sector as their 
subcontracted manufacturer of anime (p. 70). There still seems to be no consensus in the Japanese 
anime sector on how to cope with this sea change. The extent to which it will affect anime’s creative 
quality remains to be seen. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown how the socioeconomic dynamics of business within the Japanese anime sector, 
especially in terms of its overseas performance, could be contextualised using the concept of 
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involution. It has also shown how such a perspective can catalyse us to envision anime’s (somewhat 
gloomy) alternative future: the involuting Japanese anime sector might be becoming subordinate to 
the rising global/Asian entertainment conglomerates. This forms a sharp contrast with the existing 
debate on anime that mainly celebrates its global popularity. 
I would again emphasise the explorative nature of this paper: it is not a comprehensive analysis of 
the anime business in Japan, claiming that the involutionary dynamics in the Japanese anime sector 
have been verified in a positivist manner. As Geertz (1984) himself responded to criticisms made by 
formal economists on the empirical validity of the concept of involution in explaining Javanese 
agriculture, the aim for the paper in summoning the concept is to capture the socioeconomic and 
‘cultural dimensions of change’ (p. 511) in the Japanese anime sector that could not be reduced into 
a positivist analysis. In other words, the paper represents the ‘shamelessly ad hoc grappling with the 
whole grand conglomeration of social practices’ (p. 524) about ‘what is now happening’ (p. 511) in 
the Japanese anime sector. 
In fact, the trend of involution that this paper has ethnographically depicted seems to have 
developed further after my return from the field (even since I have been writing this paper). In October 
2017, the AJA (2017) issued the latest industry report on the Japanese anime business. It celebrated 
the fact that anime’s overall market size exceeded ¥2 trillion in 2016, generated by another ‘big jump’ 
in overseas sales (¥ 7676 hundred million, about 31.6% of growth from 2015) (pp. 6-7) that had 
marked ‘the maximum in the past’ (p. 75). This rapid growth in overseas revenue in 2016 was 
continuously attributed to the big purchasing power of the Euro-American and Chinese Internet 
conglomerates (pp. 8, 22-23, 46, 75). The report went on to show concern that overlaps with what 
this paper has demonstrated. Concluding provisionally that the Japanese anime sector’s attempts to 
develop its overseas business alone have ended up bearing little fruit, the report suggests that the 
further intervention of overseas big IT conglomerates in the sector might undermine its autonomy in 
terms of its business and creativity. It claims that the sector ‘should not settle for’ this trend (anjyuu 
wa yurusarenai) and should avoid becoming another ‘subcontracted manufacturer’ of anime for such 
overseas IT platformers by considering ‘what kind of measures are needed in critically strengthening 
the capacity of the Japanese anime industry vis-à-vis the overseas market’ (p. 76). 
Put differently, especially in the face of the rising presence of Asian countries in the global business 
scene, what this paper has depicted in terms of the Japanese anime sector might be a part of broader 
socioeconomic question now confronting Japan: how can Japan accept and cope with the shift in its 
relationship with Asia? Is Asia no longer Japan’s low-wage workforce supplier or the recipient of 
international aid and technology transfers, but now the investors, employers, clients and customers 
for Japan? These questions seem already to have been recognised by other Japanese industrial sectors, 
especially by the consumer electronics sector with the collapse of the sector’s several national brands 
and one of their take-over by the Asian company.11 
Although previous literature on involution tells us little about how one can invert such an 
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‘involutionary tide’, it does suggest that entrepreneurship might be a key factor (Burawoy et al. 2000, 
p. 47: cf. also Interlocutors 1 and 2). How does entrepreneurship function in carrying out overseas 
anime business, especially in terms of its conflict with the inertia of involutionary domestic market 
centrism, especially accompanied by the intervention of global/transnational media conglomerates? 
Several scholars have begun addressing the question of entrepreneurship in anime studies (e.g. Daliot-
Bul 2014, Mihara 2017, Otmazgin 2011, 2014). Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship could become 
one of the critical analytical points of reference (vis-à-vis involution) in approaching anime in future. 
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